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Why Not Tel the

Truth?
CharlesWMurdock*

Earlier this year, when I was
asked to give a talk on business ethics
for MBA students at another university, the first thought that came to mind
as a topic was, "Why not tell the
truth?" This in turn triggered the
image of an ad run by Volvo in the
early 1990s. The ad showed a monster truck driving over the top of a
row of cars, crushing the roofs of all
except the Volvo. But the Volvo's roof
was reinforced with lumber and steel
that the viewers couldn't see, whereas
the other cars' roof support pillars
were severed or weakened.
What made this advertisement all the more memorable was an
article in the Wall Street Journal
which focused upon it and quoted a
University of Michigan business
school professor, who opined, "I don't
find these commercials morally
repugnant, or have any legal concerns
about them."' In essence, the professor viewed the ads is merely a
metaphor for the idea that a Volvo
was a very safe car.
In discussing this subject, one
person suggested that, if Christ could
speak in parables, why can't businessmen speak in metaphors. At first
blush, this might appear to be a valid
point. However, on examination, the
*Mr. Murdock is a professor of business organizations,
business planning, and securities law at Loyola University
Chicago. He has served as a consultant to the SEC and as
Deputy Attorney General of Illinois, and he frequently
serves as an arbitrator or expert witness in business disputes.

analogy fails. Christ spoke in parables
in order to make us think to discover
the truth. The Volvo ad is not
designed to lead us to the truth but
rather to create a visceral impression
that a Volvo is the safest car. The
Volvo story is not a parable, but rather
a blatantly deceptive attempt to influence buying habits.
The sad reality is that truth is
the victim in so many aspects of our
society. By representing that Saddam
Hussein possessed weapons of mass
destruction and was an "immediate
threat" to the United States, the
American public was lead to support
a preemptive war in Iraq. It now
appears improbable that Saddam actually did possess such weapons.
Depending upon political persuasion,
one may believe that the weapons
claim was a lie or merely an erroneous conclusion. However, the evidence now seems to indicate that the
intelligence community's assessment
that Saddam "may have" was translated into public communications as
"does have." Is this semantics or
deception?
Such issues undercut public
trust in the government. This trust is
further eroded when a key administrationofficial such as Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld reconstructs the terms that were used to
describe the "immediate threat" presented by Saddam Hussein, as he did
recently on national television. 2 In
light of what has been learned in the
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past several months, some of the
deception that arises in the political
arena could be considered humorous,
if only the results were less tragic.
Returning to the world of
business and then to the interface of
politics and business, business leaders
extol our stock market system as an
efficient market. Lawyers and economists, particularly the "law and economic" types, tell us that stock prices
"impound" all the information that is
publicly disclosed. The Supreme
Court has accepted the "fraud on the
market" theory, which holds that the
price of a company's stock is determined by the available information
regarding the company and its business, as supporting a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 3
In view of the foregoing, one
would expect that Congress and the
federal courts would be vigilant in
ensuring that the information by a
company's management is truthful
and forthcoming. But it does not
always play out that way.
In 1995, Congress passed the
Private Litigation Securities Reform
Act ("PLRSA").4 It provided, in part,
that when a plaintiff alleges that management has made a misstatement, the
complaint "shall specify each statement alleged to be misleading, the
reason or reason why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation ... is
made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which the belief is
SPRING 2004
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formed."' It also provided that if the
scienter or mental state of mind of the
defendant is an element of the cause
of action, the complaint shall "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference" that the defendant
acted with scienter. 6
On their face, the above provisions do not seem that extraordinary-except that the PLSRA further
requires that pleading with particularity be done without the benefit of discovery. 7 On top of that, some courts
have exalted "particularity" to place
an absurd pleading burden on the
Plaintiff.
Let's take a look at one decision, Silicon GraphicsInc. Securities
Litigation,8 handed down by the supposedly "liberal" Ninth Circuit.
Plaintiff alleged that six of the com-

The Volvo story is not
a parable, but rather
a blatantly deceptive
attempt to .influence
buying habits.
pany's top officers made a series of
misleading statements to inflate the
value of the company's stock, while
they engaged in massive insider trading. The majority set forth some of
plaintiffs allegations:
September 19, 1995:
McCracken told Morgan
Stanley that there were "no supply
constraints" on the Indigo2.
September 21, 1995: McCracken
announced at an industry conference that Indigo2 sales growth
''was accelerating."
September 22, 1995: McCracken
told Morgan Stanley that "that
there is no problem with [Indigo2],
nor is there an engineering halt."
September 26, 1995: SGI
announced "volume shipments" of
the Indigo2 workstation.9
SPRING 2004
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The reality was this:
Soon thereafter, SGI began to publicly confirm the negative rumors
about its performance. On January
2, 1996, the company announced
its disappointing second quarter
results and acknowledged that revenue growth for the year would be
much lower than expected. The
next day, SGI's stock fell to $21.1/8
On January 17, 1996, SGI's officers admitted to securities analysts
that SGI had been unable to fill
Indigo2 orders because of a short
age of ASIC chips and other primary components. They also
acknowledged that OEM, North
American, and European sales had
all been down.10
According to the court, the complaint
lacked "particularity." The majority
acknowledged that:
Brody alleges that SGI's internal
reports (footnote omitted) alerted
the officers to serious production
and sales problems. According to
Brody, the Flash reports, Financial
Statements/Packages and Stop
Ship reports announced that: (1)
SGI was not shipping the Indigo2
workstation in volume; (2) North
American and European sales
remained slow; and (3) SGI would
not meet its revenue and growth
targets for FY96. Brody contends
that the reports notified the officers
that SGI was suffering "weak
North American sales due to continuing problems with its North
American direct sales force" and "a
very poor Oct., with revenues, net
income and earnings per share well
below forecasted and budgeted levels."I I
However:

It is not sufficient for a plaintiffs
pleadings to set forth a belief that
certain unspecified sources will
reveal, after appropriate discovery,
facts that will validate her claim.
In this case, Brody's complaint
does not include adequate corroborating details. She does not mention, for instance, the sources of
her information with respect to the
reports, how she learned of the
reports, who drafted them, or
which officers received them. Nor
does she include an adequate
description of their contents which
we believe-if they did exist-would
include countless specifics regard
ing ASIC chip shortages, volume
shortages, negative financial projections, and so on. We would
expect that a proper complaint
which purports to rely on the existence of internal reports would
contain at least some specifics
from those reports as well as such
facts as may indicate their reliability. 12

From a standpoint of encouraging truthfulness by corporate executive, the Silicon Graphics decision is
disturbing in several respects. First of
all, how much specificity about inside
corporate machinations is really possible without the benefit of discovery?
If an informant is used to gain information, the Ninth Circuit would probably require that a plaintiff set forth
the identity of the informant as part of
the "particularity" requirement. 13 If
this were required, who would be a
willing informant and run the risk of
being black-balled in the industry?
Fortunately, later decisions in other
circuits have rejected the necessity to
name the informant.14

The Ninth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the
district court erroneously concluded
that the officers' stock sales were not
unusual or suspicious.
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This Court has recognized that
only "[i]nsider trading in suspicious amounts or at suspicious
times is probative of bad faith and
scienter." [Citation omitted.]
Insider trading is suspicious when
"dramatically out of line with prior
trading practices at times calculated to maximize personal benefit
from undisclosed inside information." [Citation omitted.] In this
case, we conclude that the stock
trading was not dramatically out of
line with prior trading practices or
otherwise suspicious enough to
create a strong inference of the
required deliberate recklessness. 5
Manager's Name
McCracken
Kelly
Sekimoto
Baskett
Ramsay
Burgess

Sold per court
60,000/2,305,382
20,000/45,790
7,600/110,811
30,000/390,577
20,000/489,978
250,588/332,746

Kelly's and Burgess's sales appear
somewhat suspicious-they sold
43.6 and 75.3 percent of their
respective holdings. 16
Even with respect to the latter two
sales, the Court determined that scienter could not be inferred because
Kelly only sold 20,000 shares and
Brody was prohibited from selling his
stock, which he received when his
former company was acquired by
Silicon graphics, until the present
quarter.' 7
A truer picture of the motivation of the defendants is presented in
the table below.18 The Court failed to
acknowledge that the defendants sold
their shares at about $37 per share
after the misleading statements were
made, and that the stock fell to $21
when the true facts were released by
the company.1 9 Thus, the defendants
saved millions of dollars as a result of
their misleading statements.

Not only the action of the
executives but also that of the court
could stand scrutiny. At a minimum,
this is an example of structural bias in
which the court and the executives
think the same way, but it also suggests a more serious inference of
improper court motives that serve to
mislead the public while releasing the
misleading executives from accountability.
The PSLRA contains another
provision that it does not "impose
upon any person a duty to update"
forward-looking statements, such as
earnings projections. 20 One case,
without relying on this PSLRA provision, held that there was no duty to
update on the following rationale:
[W]e do not think it can be said
that an ordinary earnings projection contains an implicit representation on the part of the company
that it will update the investing
public with all material informa12.31;96

The preceding table shows the sales
of stock by the insiders that were not
"unusual or suspicious:"
The Court opined that such
sales were not suspicious for the following reasons:
All but two of the officers in this
case sold a relatively small portion
of their total holdings and traded in
a manner consistent with prior
practice. Collectively, the officers
even including the two who sold
the greatest percentage of their
holdings-retained 90 percent of
their available holdings. President
McCracken sold just 2.6 percent of
his holdings and options. Vice
President Baskett sold 7.7 percent.
Senior Vice Presidents Ramsay and
Sekimoto sold 4.1 and 6.9 percent,
respectively. Senior Vice President

Name
McCracken
Kelly
Sekimoto
Ramsay

Sold per court
60,000/2,305.382
20,000,45,790
7600 110. 811
3.00/90 77
20i.000489,978

Burgess

250,88/332,746

14kelt

Proceeds
2.186.000
743,000
266.988
1.097.500
7 46,071

The above graph also illustrates that, rather than the defendants
only selling a small percentage of
their stock, as the Court opined, they
actually sold 17 percent to 95 percent
of the stock they actually owned. The
Court's figures were predicated on
both stock owned and stock under
option. The stock under option should
be ignored because the executives
were not at risk for these shares.
However, with respect to their actual
holdings, for which they had paid a
price, they were at risk, and they
avoided this risk by selling on inside
information.
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Sales per
holding
60.000,358,000
20,000`20.815
7.600/10.667
30,000/37,620
20,000150309

Residual
1oldings
298.716
815
3.067
7.620
30.309

8.761,294

tion that relates to that forecast.
Under existing law, the market
knows that companies have neither
a specific obligation to disclose
internal forecasts nor a general
obligation to disclose all material
information.
Finally, the federal securities laws,
as they stand today, aim at encouraging companies to disclose their
forecasts. A judicially created rule
that triggers a duty of continuous
disclosure of all material information every time a single specific
earnings forecast is disclosed
SPRING 2004
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would likely result in a drastic
reduction in the number of such
projections made by companies. It
is these specific earnings projections that are the most useful to
investors in deciding whether to
invest in a firm's securities. 21
This is a classic case of circular reasoning. The court says that
investors use company forecasts in
determining whether to invest.
However, the court does not want to
impose a duty to update because that
might discourage companies from
issuing forecasts. But if there is a
basis for updating, it means that the

This is an example of
structural bias in
which the court and
the executives think
the same way, but it
also suggests a more
serious inference of
improper court
motives that serve to
mislead the public
while releasing the
misleading executives
from accountability.
original forecast is wrong! If the company does not update, it means that
investors are relying on erroneous
forecasts. It is hard to see how this
helps the efficiency of the market.
Moreover, assume that a forecast was originally made without an
adequate basis so that investors were
misled from the start. The PSLRA
also provides that a plaintiff can bring
suit only if he or she proves that the
projection "was made with actual
knowledge ... that the statement was
false or misleading." 22 Once again,
discovery is stayed if the defendant
2 )04
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moves for summary judgment.
Implicit in the PSLRA and
the court decisions discussed above is
the presumption that corporate management would not mislead the
investing public. Enron, WorldCom,
and flock of other cases involving
corporate corruption demonstrate that
such a presumption is misplaced. Too
often, both business and politics fail
to hold transparency and truth as the
prevailing ethic.
This problem needs to be
addressed at both the macro and
micro levels. Perhaps Sarbanes-Oxley
will bring more integrity into the flow
of corporate information. But the
courts and Congress first need to
examine the role they play in facilitating a "tone" that leads corporate officials to believe they will not be held
accountable for their derelictions. And
we all need to examine our own attitudes towards truth as an essential
virtue in a democratic society.

been successful. The executives also attributed
the shortcoming to a drop in North American

and European orders. SGI assured investors
that (a) there were no manufacturing problems
with or supply constraints on the Indigo2; (b)

demand was strong for the workstation, and it
was being shipped in volume; and (c) the revenue target of 4 0 % for Fiscal Year 96 would be
achieved; (7) October 19, 1995: McCracken
stated in an interview that SGI's first quarter
growth was "probably less" than the growth
the Company would see during Fiscal Year
1996; (8) November 2, 1995: SGI executives

held a press conference for securities analysts
and investors, stating that (a) SGI would still
achieve its goal of 40 percent revenue growth,
and its second quarter performance should better its first quarter performance; (b) the failure
to meet growth expectations for the first quarter resulted from temporary sales force reorganization problems and a temporary drop in
sales; and (c) Indigo2 sales were beating
expectations, and the product was now shipping in volume after some initial problems with
the supply of a key chip component; (9) Early
November, 1995: SGI's first quarter report to
shareholders included a letter from McCracken
stating that the Indigo2 "began shipping in volume in September"; (10) December 15, 1995:
McCracken and another SGI executive told
Dean Witter that (a) SGI had a strong
November; (b) sales force productivity was
improving; (c) European and North American
sales were likely to improve; and (d) the
Company would meet its goal of 40 percentgrowth for the second quarter; (11) MidDecember, 1995: McCracken and another SGI
executive told Smith Barney that SGI would
meet its goal of 40 percent growth, notwith-

standing sluggish sales in some areas.
1. Wall St. 3. Nov. 19, 1990, 1990 WLWSJ
553290.
2. Transcript, Face the Nation, Mar. 14, 2004,
p. 4, available on the Internet, Google: Face
the Nation.
3. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
4. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
5. 1934 Act §21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. §78 u4(b)(1).
6. 1934 Act §21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §78u4(b)(2).
7. 1934 Act §21D(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §78u
4(b)(3).
8. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
9. Id. at According to the dissent, plaintiff
alleged the following:
(1) September 13, 1995: SGI CEO
Edward McCracken told Morgan Stanley that
there were "no supply constraints" on the production of an improved line of graphic design
computers called the "Indigo2 Impact
Workstation" ("Indigo2"); (2) September 21,
1995: McCracken announced at a computer
conference that sales growth was "accelerating"; (3) September 22, 1995: McCracken told
Morgan Stanley there was "no problem with
[the Indigo2], nor is there an engineering
halt"; (4) September 26, 1995: SGI announced
"volume shipments" of the Indigo2; (5)
October 19, 1995: SGI issued a press release
announcing 33 percent revenue growth, and
reporting that the Indigo2 was shipping in volume; (6) October 19, 1995: SGI held a conference call during which McCracken and other
executives told securities analysts and institutional investors SGI had not met its goal of 40
percent revenue growth during the first quarter
of fiscal year 1996. SGI executives explained
that the reorganization of its sales force temporarily hurt sales, but the reorganization had

10. Id. at 982.
11. Id. at 984-985.
12. Id. at 985.
13. Id.
14. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2000)
15. 183 F.3d at 987.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. This table was constructed by accessing
the Form 4s filed by defendants with the SEC.
19. 183 F.3d at 982.
20. 1934 Act 21E(d), 15 U.S.C.A. §78 u-5(d).
21. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities
Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1433 (3d. Cir. 1997).
22. 1934 Act 21E(c), 15 U.S.C.A. §78 u-5(c).
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